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Abstract
Contact transmission of pathogens from personal protective equipment is a concern within the 
healthcare industry. During public health emergency outbreaks, resources become constrained and 
the reuse of personal protective equipment, such as N95 filtering facepiece respirators, may be 
needed. This study was designed to characterize the transfer of bacteriophage MS2 and fluorescein 
between filtering facepiece respirators and the wearer’s hands during three simulated use 
scenarios. Filtering facepiece respirators were contaminated with MS2 and fluorescein in droplets 
or droplet nuclei. Thirteen test subjects performed filtering facepiece respirator use scenarios 
including improper doffing, proper doffing and reuse, and improper doffing and reuse. Fluorescein 
and MS2 contamination transfer were quantified. The average MS2 transfer from filtering 
facepiece respirators to the subjects’ hands ranged from 7.6–15.4% and 2.2–2.7% for droplet and 
droplet nuclei derived contamination, respectively. Handling filtering facepiece respirators 
contaminated with droplets resulted in higher levels of MS2 transfer compared to droplet nuclei 
for all use scenarios (p = 0.007). MS2 transfer from droplet contaminated filtering facepiece 
respirators during improper doffing and reuse was greater than transfer during improper doffing (p 
= 0.008) and proper doffing and reuse (p = 0.042). Droplet contamination resulted in higher levels 
of fluorescein transfer compared to droplet nuclei contaminated filtering facepiece respirators for 
all use scenarios (p = 0.009). Fluorescein transfer was greater for improper doffing and reuse (p = 
0.007) from droplet contaminated masks compared to droplet nuclei contaminated filtering 
facepiece respirators and for improper doffing and reuse when compared improper doffing (p = 
0.017) and proper doffing and reuse (p = 0.018) for droplet contaminated filtering facepiece 
respirators. For droplet nuclei contaminated filtering facepiece respirators, the difference in MS2 
and fluorescein transfer did not reach statistical significance when comparing any of the use 
scenarios. The findings suggest that the results of fluorescein and MS2 transfer were consistent 
and highly correlated across the conditions of study. The data supports CDC recommendations for 
using proper doffing techniques and discarding filtering facepiece respirators that are directly 
contaminated with secretions from a cough or sneeze.
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Introduction
Personal protective equipment (PPE) use in healthcare settings presents unique challenges in 
comparison to other industries given the infectious potential of the hazards. PPE can become 
contaminated when used in the presence of infectious patients or in environments where 
pathogens are present. Contaminated PPE can serve as a source for pathogens that can be 
transferred to healthcare workers (HCWs) or the environment through contact.[1]
For infection control purposes, PPE used in healthcare settings such as gloves, gowns, 
surgical masks, and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) certified 
filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs) are generally considered “single-use” devices and are 
disposed of after each patient encounter.[2] However, there are situations where the Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention has recommended that the reuse or extended use of FFRs 
be considered as one option to conserve supplies.[3] Extended use of FFRs is the process 
whereby the wearer dons a FFR and uses it for multiple patient encounters, without 
removing the FFR in between patient visits. Reuse is the process of repeated donning and 
doffing of the same FFR for multiple patient encounters.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) regulation for respiratory 
protection, described in 29 CFR 1910,[4] lists the requirements to implement a respiratory 
protection program when engineering controls are not feasible or in conjunction with 
engineering controls to enhance worker protection. In accordance with 29 CFR 1910, users 
of tight fitting respiratory protective devices such as N95 FFRs must perform actions that 
require contact with the filtering surfaces of a FFR. A FFR should be inspected prior to each 
use to ensure the FFR is suitable for proper function. This requires the user to grasp the body 
of the FFR while checking the filtering media and tethering straps for signs of damage. 
Donning the FFR also requires the user to grasp the filtering surface while holding the mask 
in position on the face while pulling the straps over their head. And, finally, the wearer is 
required to perform a user seal check to confirm that a satisfactory seal between the face and 
the FFR is achieved. This is performed by following the FFR manufacturer’s instructions, 
but generally requires the user to place both hands over the filtering surface of the FFR. 
Contact between ungloved hands and FFRs can occur if the recommended PPE donning and 
doffing sequences are followed as FFRs are donned before gloves and doffed after removing 
gloves.[5] During single use and extended use, the wearer should not come in contact with 
the contaminated front surface of the FFR if proper doffing procedures, which requires users 
to remove the FFR by grabbing the tethering straps at the back of the head, are employed.[5] 
However, it has been reported that HCWs often improperly doff N95 FFRs by grasping the 
front of the respirator’s potentially contaminated filtering surface.[6] With FFR reuse, 
contact with the potentially contaminated surface is necessary for proper use as the wearer 
must inspect, don and perform a user seal check on a FFR that may have been contaminated 
during a previous use by the wearer.
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This study was designed to characterize the transfer of bacteriophage MS2 and fluorescein, 
between FFRs and hands during three simulated FFR use scenarios, namely improper 
doffing (ID), proper doffing and reuse (PDR), and improper doffing and reuse (IDR). FFRs 
were contaminated with MS2 and fluorescein in either droplets or droplet nuclei. Droplets 
were used to loosely mimic contamination of a FFR by wet particles via a direct cough or 
sneeze, while droplet nuclei simulate contamination from dry aerosolized particles that 
remain airborne for an extended period of time. Droplets are large-wet particles that have 
been shown to contaminate the outermost surface of the FFR, while droplet nuclei are small-
dry particles that penetrate into the filtering medium of the FFR.[7] Test subjects mimicked 
FFR use in healthcare by doffing, inspecting, donning, and performing a user seal check on 
contaminated FFRs. The study hypotheses are: (1) FFRs contaminated with droplets will 
lead to greater contact transfer compared to FFRs contaminated by droplet nuclei; (2) 
contact transfer of MS2 and fluorescein will be greater for FFR reuse scenarios (PDR & ID) 
compared to ID given the high contact area required to perform a user seal check during 
reuse; and (3) fluorescein and MS2 contamination transfer will exhibit significant 
correlation and similar patterns among the statistical tests.
Methods
Test subjects
The study was approved by the NIOSH Institutional Review Board, and all subjects were 
provided informed consent. A total of 15 subjects were recruited for this study. Subjects 
were selected between the ages of 18–60. The simulated FFR use procedures were 
conducted on a head form; therefore, only the subjects’ hands were at risk of exposure. 
Participants were prohibited from participation if they had any open sores, cuts, scrapes, or 
abrasions on their hands. Participants with a history of skin cancer or sensitivity to UV light 
were excluded from the study.
N95 filtering facepiece respirator
The N95 3M 1860 model respirator (3M, St. Paul, MN) used for this study is a NIOSH-
approved FFR commonly used by healthcare workers for respiratory protection. The 3M 
1860 is FDA cleared for use as surgical mask.
Virus, host cells, and plaque assay
Bacteriophage MS2 ATCC 15597-B1 (American Type Culture Collection, Manassas, VA) 
served as the challenge virus. Bacteriophage MS2 is non-pathogenic to humans and is 
widely used as a surrogate for gastrointestinal and respiratory viruses for human subject 
testing. The MS2 was propagated and enumerated using Escherichia coli ATCC 15597 
(American Type Culture Collection) in ATCC 271 medium (recipe available at 
www.atcc.org) as the host. Recovery of MS2 virus was quantified through single-layer 
method plaque assay.[8] Plates containing visible virus plaques were counted the following 
day; plate counts falling between 30 and 300 PFU were recorded. Control plates consisting 
of E. coli with MS2 and E. coli without MS2 were poured in parallel to the experimental 
plates to assess the validity of the plaque assay.
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FFR contamination with MS2 and fluorescein
Droplet nuclei—A two-chamber system, consisting of an aerosol mixing chamber 
(Vandiver Enterprises, Zelienople, PA) and a FFR loading chamber (Vandiver Enterprises), 
was used to apply MS2 aerosols to FFRs (Figure 1). 15 mL of virus suspension, consisting 
of 1010 PFU/mL in 271B medium amended with 0.25% fluorescein (Fisher Science 
Education, Nazareth, PA) was added to a 6-jet collison nebulizer (BGI, Waltham, MA). A 
mass flow meter (TSI, Shoreview, MN) upstream from a nebulizer, was used to monitor the 
air flow of 20 L/min. Dilution air was introduced downstream from the nebulizer at 30 L/
min. The nebulizer expelled the virus particles into a 43 L mixing chamber which was 
connected by hose to the FFR loading chamber. The loading chamber was connected to a 
mechanical lung (Hans Rudolph, Inc., Shawnee, KS) that was operated by a breathing 
simulator (Hans Rudolph, Inc., Shawnee, KS) set at 20 breaths per min with a target volume 
of 1.25 L. A single FFR was sealed between two custom in-house-designed plates which 
provided an airtight fit to the breathing orifice. The nebulizer was operated for 15 min to 
allow the system to equilibrate. The breathing simulator was operated for 45 min to 
contaminate the FFR to a targeted 107 PFU/FFR. Each contaminated FFR was sealed in a 
plastic bag and stored at 4°C overnight. Four FFRs were contaminated for each subject. 
Three of the FFRs were used to simulate FFR use scenarios and the fourth FFR was used to 
determine the loading level of virus. Although particle size measurements were not 
conducted during these experiments, particles with a mass median diameter of 629 nm were 
produced using the same collison nebulizer, air flow and humidity conditions, mixing 
chamber, and similar suspension medium in a previous study.[7]
Droplet—FFRs were contaminated with virus droplets inside a laminar flow biosafety 
cabinet to loosely mimic wet particles that would be emitted during a direct sneeze or cough. 
Each FFR was placed on a head form with the horizontal center seam of the FFR at a height 
of 26 cm. The droplet spray was generated using a spray bottle, (Fisher Scientific, 
Pittsburgh, PA) containing 100 mL of MS2 suspension (108 PFU/mL and 0.25% 
fluorescein), a modification to previously described method.[9] FFRs were sprayed from a 
distance of 31 cm, with a ring stand and clamp securing the nozzle at a height of 20 cm. 
FFRs were sprayed five times within approximately 10 sec. The FFRs were placed in a fume 
hood to dry for 1 hr. Once dry, the FFRs were sealed in plastic bags and stored at 4°C 
overnight. Four FFRs were contaminated for each subject. Three of the FFRs were used to 
simulate FFR use scenarios and the fourth FFR was used to determine the loading level of 
virus. The droplets produced by the spray bottle were not evaluated for particle size and 
cannot be directly compared to the particle sizes produced by sneezes or coughs. However, 
an evaluation of the droplet sizes emitted from spray bottles of commercially available 
cleaning products, similar to that used in this study, produced particles with mass mean 
diameters above 100 µm.[10]
FFR loading and deposition profile
FFRs contaminated by both the droplet spray and droplet nuclei systems were assessed to 
determine the deposition of MS2 among the multiple layers of the FFR. Three circular 
coupons (18 cm2) were cut out from randomly selected regions of a FFR. Each circular 
coupon was separated into three layers corresponding to the inner layer (the layer in closest 
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proximity to the wearer when donned), the middle layer (the electret filtering medium), and 
the outer layer (the layer furthest from the wearer when donned). Each coupon layer was 
placed in a 50 mL Falcon tube containing 10 mL 1X phosphate buffered saline (PBS) 
(Fisher Bioreagents, Fair Lawn, NJ) and agitated using a vortexer for 1 min on the highest 
speed setting. Each FFR coupon layer was removed from the tube and virus recovered from 
each layer was enumerated by plaque assay. The deposition analysis was conducted in 
triplicate for both droplet and droplet nuclei-contaminated FFRs.
Virus recovery
FFRs—Virus was recovered from FFRs using a single extraction recovery method. 
Contaminated FFRs were placed in 500 mL flasks with 200 mL PBS. The flasks were 
placed in a benchtop shaker and agitated at 300 rpm for 25 min. After the 25 min of 
agitation, the flasks were removed from the shaker and 20 mL of the virus suspension was 
transferred from the flasks into 50 mL Falcon tubes (Corning Science, Reynosa, Tamaulipas, 
MX) for virus enumeration by plaque assay.
To determine the recovery efficiency of the single extraction method, a series of six 
consecutive virus recoveries were performed on a contaminated FFR. Six 500 mL flasks 
were each filled with 200 mL of PBS. The FFR was placed into the first flask and agitated in 
the benchtop shaker using the same parameters as stated above. After shaking for 25 min, 
the FFR was moved to the second flask and a 20-mL aliquot of the virus suspension was 
collected from the first flask. The second flask was then placed in the benchtop shaker for 25 
min After which the FFR was placed into the third flask and a 20 mL aliquot of the virus 
suspension was collected from the second flask. This process was repeated on the FFR until 
all six flasks were used. The six-step recovery determination was performed in triplicate for 
both droplet and droplet nuclei contaminated FFRs. The single extraction recovery 
efficiency was estimated as a percentage of the number of viruses recovered from the FFR 
After the first recovery over the total number of viruses recovered from the six consecutive 
recoveries.
Hands—Virus was recovered from hands using the glove juice method. The test subjects 
placed each hand into a nitrile glove (Kimberly Clark, Roswell, GA) and 20 mL of sterile 
PBS was pipetted into each glove. The gloves were securely sealed by tape at the wrist and 
each hand was massaged for 60 sec. Each glove was carefully removed from the subject’s 
hand and the PBS containing the recovered virus was pipetted from the glove into a 50 mL 
Falcon tube. The sample was stored at 4°C for virus quantification.
To determine the virus recovery efficiency of the glove juice method, a known titer of virus 
was pipetted onto six locations on the hands of the test subjects and recovered using the 
glove juice method. The finger tips and palm of the hand were contaminated with 5 µL of 
virus suspension consisting of MS2 (106 PFU/mL) in 271B medium amended with 0.25% 
fluorescein. The glove juice recovery was conducted using the same methods as described 
above. Virus recovery efficiency was measured as the percentage of viruses recovered from 
the hands over the number of viruses placed on the hands.
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Fluorescein imaging and quantification
Fluorescein contamination of the hands was quantified using previously described 
methods.[11] Images of the subjects’ hands were captured under UV-A light using a Nikon 
DSLR camera (Nikon Corp., Japan) from a fixed distance of 20 cm. Images were imported 
into Image J software and analyzed using the Lasso tool to delineate the zone of visual and 
measure the surface area of contamination. The intensity of the fluorescent contamination of 
the hand was calculated generating histogram values of the Lasso tool delineated areas and 
reported as lumens. Each image was analyzed in triplicate.
Simulated FFR doffing and reuse
FFR simulated use scenarios, improper doffing (ID), proper doffing and reuse (PDR), and 
improper doffing and reuse (IDR), were conducted for both droplet nuclei and droplet spray 
contaminated FFRs for a total of 6 FFR use scenarios performed by each subject (3 for 
droplet and 3 for droplet nuclei). The order of the tests was randomized for each subject. 
Each subject was required to wash their hands for 2 min, as per the World Health 
Organization hand washing protocol prior to each test.[12] The subject was instructed on how 
to perform proper and improper donning/doffing, a user seal check, and FFR inspection. A 
research technician placed each contaminated mask onto the head form prior to each test. 
The test subject stood behind the head form, which was mounted on a tripod and adjusted to 
each subject’s height. The subject performed one of three FFR use scenarios as described 
below and represented in Figure 2. After the subjects performed the FFR use action, images 
of the subject’s hands were captured and virus was recovered from the hands using the glove 
juice method.
Improper doffing (ID)—Subjects removed the FFR by grabbing the filtering surface of the 
front of the mask and placed it in a bin 5 ft away from the head form.
Proper doffing and reuse (PDR)—Subjects removed the FFR from the head form by 
the grabbing the straps, placed the FFR in a bin placed 5 ft from the head form. The subjects 
then picked up the FFR from the bin and performed a 5-sec inspection. Following the 
inspection, the subjects placed the FFR on the head form, and performed a user seal check.
Improper doffing and reuse (IDR)—Subjects removed the FFR by grabbing the 
filtering surface of the front of the mask and placed it in a bin 5 ft away from the head form. 
The subjects then picked up the FFR from the bin and performed a 5-sec inspection. 
Following the inspection, the subjects placed the FFR on the head form, and performed a 
user seal check.
Data analysis
Percentage transfer (T) of MS2 from FFRs to each hand was calculated by the following 
equation:
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where (PFU(hand))is the number of viruses recovered from the hands, (PFU(FFR)) is the 
number of viruses recovered from the FFR, Er(hand) is the correction factor (1.6) for the 
recovery efficiency of the glove juice method and Er(FFR) is the correction factor (1.1 and 2.0 
for droplet and droplet nuclei contaminated masks, respectively) for the recovery efficiency 
of the FFRs.
Percentage transfer for FFR use scenarios (ID, PDR, IDR), was determined by summing 
T(L.hand) and T(R.hand). Statistical significance of MS2 and fluorescein transfer between FFR 
use scenarios and contamination types was determined by appropriate mean difference tests 
(Wilcoxon or T-Test).
Results
FFR loading and deposition profile
The average number of viruses deposited on the FFRs was 3 × 107 PFUs and 7 × 107 PFUs 
for FFRs contaminated using the droplet and droplet nuclei systems, respectively. 99% of the 
viruses applied to FFRs using the droplet method were deposited on the outer layer of the 
FFR, whereas 14% of the viruses deposited on FFRs using the droplet nuclei system were 
found on the outer layer. Virus was not detected on the inner layer of the FFRs contaminated 
with droplets or droplet nuclei.
Contamination transfer of FFR use scenarios by contamination type
MS2—For the three types of FFR use scenarios, ID, PDR, and IDR, the average MS2 
transfer efficiency measured 7.6, 7.0, and 15.5%, respectively, when handling droplet 
contaminated FFRs and 2.2, 2.7, and 2.7%, respectively, when handling droplet nuclei 
contaminated FFRs (Figure 3). To test the statistical significance of the differences in MS2 
transfer between droplet and droplet nuclei conditions, Wilcoxon rank sum tests were 
executed given a violation of the homogeneity of variance assumption. Handling FFRs 
contaminated with droplets resulted in statistically significant higher levels of virus transfer 
from FFRs to the subjects’ hands compared to droplet nuclei contaminated FFRs for ID (p = 
0.003), PDR (p = 0.007), and IDR (p < 0.001).
Fluorescein—For the three types of FFR use scenarios, ID, PDR, and IDR, the average 
fluorescein transfer intensity measured 6.1, 4.6, and 22.6 lumens, respectively, when 
handling droplet contaminated FFRs and 3.6, 2.7, and 5.1 lumens, respectively, when 
handling droplet nuclei contaminated FFRs (Figure 4). Given the violation of the 
homogeneity of variance assumption the Wilcoxon rank sum test was used to determine if 
the observed mean differences between droplet and droplet nuclei in the fluorescein 
condition were statistically significant. Handling FFRs contaminated with droplets resulted 
in statistically significant higher levels of virus transfer from FFRs to the subjects’ hands 
compared to droplet nuclei contaminated FFRs for IDR (p = 0.007). Transfer was not 
statistically different between droplet nuclei and droplet derived contamination for PDR and 
ID.
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Contamination transfer of FFR use scenarios within contamination type
MS2—A two-tailed t-test was used in this case given the assumptions were met: normal 
distribution and equal variances of dependent variable. These assumptions were tested prior 
to the execution of the test. MS2 transfer for the droplet contaminated FFRs resulting from 
IDR was statistically greater than transfer during ID (p = 0.008) and PDR (p = 0.042), while 
transfer during ID and PDR were not statistically different (p > 0.05). For droplet nuclei 
contaminated FFRs, difference in MS2 transfer did not reach statistical significance when 
comparing any of the FFR use scenarios.
Fluorescein—T-tests were used given the assumptions for the parametric mean difference 
approach were met. Similar to the MS2 context, fluorescein transfer for the droplet 
contaminated FFRs resulting from IDR was statistically greater than transfer during ID (p = 
0.017) and PDR (p = 0.018), while transfer during ID and PDR were not statistically 
different (p > 0.05). For droplet nuclei contaminated FFRs, difference in fluorescein transfer 
did not reach statistical significance when comparing any of the FFR use scenarios.
Comparison of statistical outcomes for fluorescein and MS2 transfer data
A Pearson correlation coefficient was derived to examine the level of association between 
the mean values of MS2 and fluorescein across the experimental conditions of the study. The 
correlation was very high and significant (r = .92, p <.001). This suggests MS2 and 
fluorescein are nearly equivalent in terms of the rank order of contamination transfer levels 
across conditions of the study.
Fluorescein and MS2 transfer exhibited similar patterns in the direction of mean-
contamination difference among the conditions of the study as well as the results of the 
statistical tests performed to test the mean difference. Table 1 shows the mean difference test 
conducted by scenario, statistical method, and indicates whether the direction of the mean 
difference and the results of the significance tests were consistent between MS2 and 
fluorescein contamination contexts. Nine of the ten experiments resulted in an equivalent 
pattern in the direction of mean differences among the conditions of the study. For the single 
condition that resulted in an inconsistent mean difference direction (i.e., the difference in 
droplet nuclei contamination levels between the ID and PDR experiments) the mean 
difference was minimal and consistently non-significant between the MS2 and fluorescein 
contexts. Eight of ten experiments resulted in an equivalent test of statistical significance. 
For the two conditions in which there were inconsistent significance values for the mean 
contamination difference (droplet vs. droplet nuclei in the ID and PDR experiments) the 
direction of the mean difference was consistent between the MS2 and fluorescein contexts—
where the magnitude of the mean difference was greater for MS2 compared to fluorescein.
Parametric analysis of the FFR use scenarios for both droplet and droplet nuclei tests 
exhibited the same pattern of statistical outcomes for MS2 and fluorescein. The direction of 
the mean difference between droplet and droplet nuclei was similar between MS2 and 
fluorescein for nine of the 10 scenarios, the results of the nonparametric analysis classified 
two of the four tests as distinct in terms of the statistical significance of the difference. The 
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two tests for which inconsistencies in statistical signifcance were found were between 
droplet and droplet nuclei for the ID scenario and the PDR scenario.
Discussion
This study is one of the first to quantify the transfer efficiency of virus from a NIOSH-
approved/FDA cleared N95 surgical FFR to hands of human subjects during donning and 
doffing exercises that mimic FFR contamination routes and FFR use in healthcare. 
Recommended PPE donning and doffing sequences used in healthcare require FFRs to be 
donned before gloves and doffed After removing gloves; thus, it is possible that ungloved 
hands can come in contact with FFRs.[5] The virus was applied as droplets and droplet 
nuclei to simulate potential exposure routes from direct cough or sneeze and air-circulating 
particles, respectively. The study revealed a few key findings that address, in part, 
knowledge gaps related to FFR use and reuse in healthcare. First, contrary to our hypotheses 
improper doffing led to higher transfer levels of contamination transfer compared to the 
actions associated with reuse scenarios, in particular, performing a user seal check. Second, 
as hypothesized, droplet contamination exhibited higher transfer efficiencies compared to 
droplet nuclei contamination for the tested model of FFR. Finally, our results show 
significant correlation and a similar pattern in results between fluorescein and virus transfer.
Although an elaborate exploration of the physical factors of contact transmission is beyond 
the scope of this article, a few generalizations about the forces of the FFR use actions can be 
surmised for the purpose of comparison. Grasping the FFR by the filtering surface while 
doffing requires a greater force on the FFR compared to the force required to perform a user 
seal check. However, performing a user seal check requires a greater area of contact than 
grasping the FFR. Pressure is the quotient of force over area; therefore, grasping the FFR 
generates more pressure on the contaminated FFR than performing the user seal check. We 
initially hypothesized that the high surface contact would lead to greater transfer 
efficiencies; however, the results do not support this initial assumption. This result was not 
entirely unexpected as Mbithi et al.[13] examined the influence of contact pressure on 
contamination transfer and found that a 5-fold increase in pressure led to a 3-fold increase in 
transfer of hepatitis A virus from metal disks to fingers. Friction, the resisting force between, 
in this case, the FFR and the hands, may also lead to higher levels of contamination transfer. 
Friction forces should be greater for FFR doffing compared to performing a user seal check. 
In a 2001 study, Sattar et al.[14] reported that friction increased the level of transfer from 
fabrics to fingerpads by as much as 5-fold and noted that the effect of friction was not the 
same across the tested fabric types.
The transfer efficiency of virus from FFRs that were contaminated via the droplet nuclei 
route were comparable to reported transfer efficiencies for other porous surfaces, while the 
droplet contaminated masks resulted in transfer efficiencies that are higher than expected for 
porous materials. Other studies report transfer efficiencies less than 1% for various porous 
surfaces. Rusin et al.[15] measured transfer fractions for bacteria (<0.15%) and a 
bacteriophage (<0.01%) from a variety of porous surfaces, such as laundry, dish cloths, and 
sponges during task-based activities, such as wringing out the dish cloths and sponges, and 
transferring laundry. Similarly, Desai et al.(16) reported transfer efficiencies of less than 1% 
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for a bacterium, Staphylococcus aureus, from porous surfaces to pigskin. The method for 
contaminating the masks may have contributed to transfer efficiencies exceeding 1%.
Contact transfer experiments are often conducted by placing drops of liquid containing a 
known titer of virus or bacteria onto the donor surface.[1,17] When using porous donor 
surfaces, the liquid inoculum penetrates the substrate and the microbial challenge is further 
dispersed by wicking through the substrate. For studies using FFRs, aerosols are often used 
to contaminate masks to better mimic the manner that FFRs would be exposed to pathogens 
while in use. The aerosol is moved via airflow through the FFR depositing particles on and 
within the fibrous matrix. Each particle contains multiple viruses which varies depending on 
numerous factors including particle size and the homogeneity of virus within the aerosol 
medium. Therefore, each particle that moves from the donor surface to the recipient surface 
will likely transfer multiple viruses, perhaps leading to increased transfer efficiency. 
McDonagh et al.[18] examined transfer efficiency of fluorescein particles deposited as an 
aerosol on porous and non-porous surfaces to other porous and nonporous surfaces. Porous-
donor surfaces were determined to be a significant route of contaminant transfer; however, 
the effect of the aerosol method of contamination had on the outcome is not evident.
The droplet method of contamination used in this study is similar to the liquid drop methods 
common to other transfer efficiency investigations; however, the hydrophilic property of the 
FFR is atypical of more routinely used porous surfaces. The FFR model used in this study is 
an FDA cleared surgical FFR, which is required to demonstrate fluid resistance against 
synthetic blood penetration at various pressures.[19] The fluid resistance is a result of textile 
composition or finishes that form a hydrophobic barrier on the surface of the FFR. The 
hydrophobic property of the outer layer of the FFR causes most of the virus laden fluid to 
remain on the surface of the mask, whereas most porous surfaces allow the virus or bacteria 
to become imbedded within the fibers of the substrate, thus limiting contact between the 
microbes and the recipient surface.
Studies have demonstrated that simulations using fluorescent agents can be useful in 
visualizing the transfer of contamination from PPE to the user.[1,20,21] This study sought to 
examine the efficacy of fluorescein as a possible surrogate for virus in the context of 
quantifying PPE contamination transfer. The analysis of MS2 and fluorescein contamination 
demonstrated a similar pattern of findings in terms of the direction of the mean 
contamination difference between conditions of the study and among the parametric and 
nonparametric mean difference tests between conditions included in this study. Given that 
two of the ten statistical tests did not result in equivalent findings of statistical significance 
between the contamination types, future studies are needed to determine how, when, and 
where fluorescein contamination serves as an equivalent surrogate to virus contamination. 
However, it should be noted that the small sample size in the current study may have 
contributed to the finding of non-significance for the Wilcoxon rank sum test of the 
difference between droplet and droplet nuclei in the ID and PDR fluorescein conditions. 
Although subject to future studies, this finding adds to the body of evidence that fluorescein 
can potentially be used to accurately study PPE contamination and transfer. For example, 
Tomas et al.[21] found that the incidence of contamination of hands and forearms during 
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glove removal to be similar for both MS2 and a fluorescent lotion, but did not examine 
similarity in the challenge level of contamination.
Conclusions
The findings in this article support CDC recommendations that allow for FFR reuse and 
extended use in a public health emergency. Proper N95 doffing technique is an essential step 
in limiting self-contamination from contaminated PPE including FFRs, and proved to be 
effective in this study. Droplet contamination leads to higher contact transfer of 
contamination; therefore, FFRs contaminated with blood, respiratory or nasal secretions, or 
other bodily fluids from patients should be discarded.[22] If N95 FFR reuse is performed 
with proper technique, the potential for self-contamination can be minimized.
Limitations
For the safety of the study participants, a head form was used to assess contamination 
transfer from FFR use scenarios. It is possible that using the head form affected the pressure 
with which the subjects grabbed the FFR for doffing or placed their hands on the surface 
while performing a user seal check. The contaminating fluid consisting of growth medium, 
fluorescein, and MS2 was not designed to simulate properties of respiratory secretions, 
which may affect transfer efficiency. Only one N95 model was used in this study and the 
interpretation of the results may not be applicable to other FFR models.
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Figure 1. 
Droplet nuclei contamination system consisting of (A) mass flow meters; (B) aerosol inlet 
port; (C) collison nebulizer; (D) mixing chamber; (E) loading chamber; (F) filtering 
facepiece respirator; (G) mechanical lung; and (H) breathing simulator.
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Figure 2. 
FFR use scenarios. Columns: (A) improper doffing; (B) proper doffing and reuse; and (C) 
improper doffing and reuse. Contact actions. Rows: 1, doffing, 2, inspecting, 3, donning, and 
4, user seal check.
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Figure 3. 
Mean percentage of virus transferred from the FFR contaminated with droplets (solid bars) 
and droplet nuclei (striped bars) to the hands during improper doffing, proper doffing and 
reuse and improper doffing and reuse. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 4. 
Mean fluorescein transfer from FFRs contaminated with droplets (solid bars) and droplet 
nuclei (striped bars) to the hands during improper doffing, proper doffing, and reuse and 
improper doffing and reuse. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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Table 1
Statistical significance for each mean difference test for MS2 versus fluorescein data.
Particle type FFR use scenario Statistical method Direction of mean 
difference
Statistical significance of mean 
difference
droplet vs droplet nuclei all scenarios Wilcoxon rank sum test consistent consistent, significant
droplet vs droplet nuclei ID Wilcoxon rank sum test consistent inconsistent
droplet vs droplet nuclei PDR Wilcoxon rank sum test consistent inconsistent
droplet vs droplet nuclei IDR Wilcoxon rank sum test consistent consistent, significant
droplet ID vs PDR t-test consistent consistent, not significant
droplet ID vs IDR t-test consistent consistent, significant
droplet PDR vs IDR t-test consistent consistent, significant
droplet nuclei ID vs PDR t-test inconsistent consistent, not significant
droplet nuclei ID vs IDR t-test consistent consistent, not significant
droplet nuclei PDR vs IDR t-test consistent consistent, not significant
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